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negligence and assumption of risk-certainly relevant considerations
in cigarette-cancer cases. And, should the consumer sue on an
express warranty, he must show that an alleged assurance was
actually an express warranty pertaining to the harm suffered;
that it could reasonably be relied upon; and that he did in fact
rely upon it. In addition to these safeguards, the approach of
Judge Goodrich seemingly protects the manufacturer from an
excessive exposure to 38absolute liability based on a causal relationship laden with doubt.

REAL PROPERTY SANCE No BASIS FOR

Lis PENDENS - ACTION TO ABATE NuiLis PENDENS.-The owners and developers

of a tract of land constructed conduits which collected surface
water and diverted it onto the plaintiffs' adjacent property.
Plaintiffs brought suit, seeking damages and a mandatory injunction ordering defendants to eliminate the conduits, and filed a
notice of lis pendens against the defendants' property. Special
Term granted defendants' motion to cancel the lis pendens,
conditioned upon the filing of an undertaking of $10,000. On
appeal the Appellate Division reinstated the lis pendens. In
a four-to-three decision, the Court of Appeals reversed and held
that the plaintiffs were not entitled to file a lis pendens, since the
action was one to abate a nuisance, and not one affecting the "use"
of land within the meaning of Section 120 of the New York Civil
Practice Act. Braunston v. Anchorage Woods, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d
302, 178 N.E.2d 717, 222 N.Y.S.2d 316 (1961).
At the beginning of the 19th century New York followed the
common-law doctrine of Us pendens,' which provided that a grantee
of real property who received title from a litigant during the
pendency of an action concerning the land took title subject to
the outcome of the litigation.2 This rule caused hardship to innocent purchasers who often had no way of discovering whether
real property was the subject of litigation at the time of purchase.-,
38 It is interesting to note that, in light of the concurring opinion, the
majority advised the lower court, on remand, to submit interrogatories to the
jury in order to ascertain upon which theory the jury reached their verdict.
Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 301 n.18 (3d Cir.
1961).
11957 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 88, N.Y. JUDICIAL CONFERENcE SECOND ANNUAL REoRT 107 [hereinafter cited as 1957 N.Y. LEa. Doc. No. 88].
2 1957 N.Y. LEa. Doc. No. 88, at 107.
3 Ibid.
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To reduce this hardship New York enacted a statute in 1823,
which provided that purchasers of land would not be bound by
the results of a pending suit affecting the land, unless a notice of
pendency of the suit was filed in the county in which the land
was situated.4 The legislature thereby sought to preserve the rights
of plaintiffs and, at the same time, protect innocent purchasers.5
Today, with the exception of certain specified instances in which
the filing of a lis pendens is a requisite for maintaining the action,6
filing is at the option of the litigant. This "permissive" Us pendens
is governed by Section 120 of the Civil Practice Act. The present
provision differs from the 1823 statute in that the right to file
is restricted to litigants in actions "brought to recover a judgment
affecting the title to, or the possession, use or enjoyment of real
property." 7 In the principal case neither the title nor the right
to possess the defendants' land was contested; therefore, the right
to file a Us pendens depended upon whether the action was one
affecting the "use or enjoyment" of that land.
Numerous lower courts in New York have undertaken to
define what the legislature meant by the "use" of land, but apparently the question has not been previously before the Court of
Appeals.
One apparent factor which has been utilized as a
criterion by the lower courts is: whose property is involved?
A fis pendens has been permitted when the purpose of an
4 Laws of New York, 1823, ch. 182, at 213. This statute provided that,
"in case any bill is filed . . . in the court of chancery of this state, which,
by the laws and rules of the court of chancery of this state, would amount
to a constructive notice to a purchaser or purchasers of any real estate;
it shall not be so deemed or held hereafter in any court in this state,
unless the complainant shall file with the clerk of the county, in which
the lands to be affected by such constructive notice are situate, a notice of
the pendency of such suit in equity, which notice shall set forth the title
of said cause, and the general object thereof, together with a description of
the land to be affected thereby, and such county clerk shall place upon an
index to be kept in his office, such references to the said notices, as will
enable all persons interested, to search his office for such notice without
inconvenience." Ibid.
5 1957 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 88, at 107.
6 In the following actions, lis pendens must be filed "at least twenty days
before a final judgment directing a sale is rendered": in an action to foreclose a mortgage on real estate, N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 1080; in a proceeding
to appoint a committee for an incompetent where real estate is intended to
be affected, N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 1361; in an action to establish a lien
against a multiple dwelling used for prostitution, N.Y. MULT. DwELL. LAW
§ 356; in an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien on real property, N.Y. LmiN
LAW §§ 17, 18; in a proceeding to register title to real property, N.Y. REAL
PROP. LAW § 382. Also, in actions to enforce a "mortgage, charge, lien or
encumbrance" against real property, the pendency of the action is not notice
to the registrar or anyone dealing with the property or any interest therein
until a notice of the pendency is filed. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 420.
7 N.Y. CIV. PRAC. Ac? § 120 (emphasis added).
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action was to restrict or control the manner in which a defendant's
property was employed." Where a Us pendens was sought in
conjunction with an action to enjoin the damaging of a party wall,
the contention that the action was merely one for trespass on the
plaintiff's land was denied. 9 The court therein stated that the
plaintiff was alleging an interest in the defendant's land, that he
had been damaged by its use, and that he was "entitled to have
the use and enjoyment of defendant's land restricted and limited. . ...

0

Similarly, in a suit to enjoin a defendant from

erecting a garage on his property in violation of a zoning ordinance, the court decided that the plaintiff could file a lis pendens,
likening the case to one in which a restrictive covenant was sought
to be enforced, where a Us pendens may be filed because the
covenant is an encumbrance on the defendant's land."1 A Us
pendens has also been allowed in actions to compel a defendant
to provide lateral support for adjacent land, since an easement of
lateral support is considered an interest in defendant's land. 12 The
thread running through these cases, often explicitly mentioned,
but sometimes only implied, is that the right to restrict the use
of defendant's land is predicated upon an interest claimed by the
plaintiff in that land.
A Us pendens has not been allowed, however, where the action
would not affect the use of defendant's land, but would merely
restrain the collateral use of the plaintiff's land by the defendant.
This was the situation in Gregdon Corp. v. Fierro,13 where it was
sought to compel the removal of part of a building encroaching
upon the plaintiffs' land. The only interest in land claimed by
the plaintiffs was in their own land, i.e., that the defendants not
trespass upon it. A Us pendens was denied. A similar conclusion
was reached in Meissner v. Van Iderstine,14 where the defendant
utilized a catch basin and pipe to collect and discharge surface
water onto the plaintiff's land, a situation similar to that of the
8

E.g., Bienstock v. Nista Constr. Co., 225 App. Div. 534, 233 N.Y. Supp.
630 (1st Dep't 1929); Moeller v. Wolkenberg, 67 App. Div. 487, 73 N.Y.
Supp. 890 (1st Dep't 1902); Ottinger v. Arenal Realty Corp., 146 Misc.
847, 262 N.Y. Supp. 310 (Sup. Ct. 1930). See Leerburger v. Hennessey
Realty Co., 154 App. Div. 158, 138 N.Y. Supp. 921 (1st Dep't 1912), aff'd
vier., 214 N.Y. 659, 108 N.E. 1099 (1915).
9Moeller v. Wolkenberg, supra note 8.
10 Moeller v. Wolkenberg, supra note 8, at 489, 73 N.Y. Supp. at 891.
3. Ottinger v. Arenal Realty Corp., supra note 8.
32 Bienstock v. Nista Constr. Co., supra note 8; accord, Leerburger v.
Hennessey Realty Co., supra note 8.
13206 Misc. 530, 134 N.Y.S.2d 128 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
14206 Misc. 418, 131 N.Y.S.2d 518 (Sup. Ct. 1952). It is interesting to
note that this case, which is clearly in line with the position of the defendants
and the majority of the Court, was cited in the briefs for both parties but
was not referred to in the majority opinion.
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present case. The court stated that the action did not come
within the statutory standard for filing a permissive Us pendens,
but did not elaborate on its reasons for so finding. Nonetheless,
the fact that the plaintiff's land was in issue makes this decision
consistent with the suggested distinction that a Us pendens is available when an interest in the defendant's realty is claimed, not
when the plaintiff asserts a right in his own land.
While it is possible to suggest the above elements (plaintiff's
interest in defendant's land) as criteria utilized by the courts,
there is still lacking a definitive statement on what constitutes
"use" of land. The. courts have limited the phrase-they have
not defined it.
In the present case the Court of Appeals had an opportunity
to clarify the meaning of "use" within Section 120 of the Civil
Practice Act. While no definition was promulgated, the majority
did reiterate the criteria suggested by the lower court opinions.
In finding that this was not the type of action in which the statute
authorized the filing of a lis pendens, the Court said that the
plaintiffs were claiming "no interest in defendant's tract of land." 15
Moreover, the Court indicated that the interest sought to be
protected by filing a lis pendens must be one which would be lost
under the recording acts,' 6 stating:
. . . The usual object of filing a
right, title or interest claimed by a
might be lost under the recording
property by 1 the
defendant to a
7
of the claim.

notice of lispendens is to protect some
plaintiff in the lands of a defendant which
acts in event of a transfer of the subject
purchaser for value and without notice

Since a subsequent purchaser would be no more entitled to
continue the nuisance than the defendants, the Court held that
such an action did not claim an interest which justified the filing
of a Us pendens. Furthermore, the plaintiffs could adequately
protect themselves by obtaining an injunction against any subsequent purchasers.- 8 The Court buttressed its opinion by indicating
that the plaintiffs' motive for filing a lis pendens was "either merely
1i Braunston v. Anchorage Woods, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 302, 305, 178 N.E.2d
717, 718, 222 N.Y.S.2d 316, 318 (1961).
16According to Walsh, "the object of the recording acts . . .is to create
a permanent record of title to real property which may be examined by any
subsequent purchaser or incumbrancer, disclosing the ownership of the
property, and all restrictions, limitations or liens upon it, and to protect all
subsequent purchasers or incumbrancers for value from all outstanding
conveyances, mortgages, or other liens which have not been recorded and
of which they have no notice." WALSH, PROPERTY 767 (2d ed. 1937).
17 Braunston v. Anchorage Woods, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 302, 305, 178 N.E.2d
717, 718, 222 N.Y.S.2d 316, 318 (1961).
18 Id. at 306, 178 N.E.2d at 719, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 319.
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to embarrass the defendants or to tie up their real estate so as
to obtain security for the payment, of a judgment for damages if
they succeed in obtaining it." 19
The dissenting opinion took the position that a lis pendens
should not be denied merely because the underlying action was
in nuisance. To so deny a lis pendens would, in the opinion of
the dissent, defeat the purpose of the statute inasmuch as a subsequent purchaser would thereby be deprived of notice of a judgment which might affect his land. Thus, a developer might create
a nuisance and then sell the property, placing the responsibility
for correcting the nuisance upon the shoulders of innocent purchasers.2 0 This approach adopts a broader interpretation of "use,"
and would permit the filing of a lis pendens under section 120
without a requirement that the interest sought to be protected
be subject to the recording acts.
This decision, the first by the Court of Appeals in this area,
brings some certitude to an area of law heretofore unclear. Under
this rule, a lis pendens may be filed where a plaintiff claims an
interest in defendant's land, provided the interest is subject to
the recording acts. The application of this rule might, however,
produce some undesirable results. Thus, to finally abate a nuisance, a plaintiff may well be required to institute a separate
action against a subsequent purchaser without notice. 21 Furthermore, the innocent purchaser would thereby be subjected to an
action, the possibility of which would have been revealed had a
lis pendens been filed.
It would seem that the Court of Appeals, in its zeal to preserve the free alienability of property, which a lis pendens admittedly hampers, may have let pass an opportunity to establish
a rule of law which would serve to protect many innocent parties
and reduce litigation.

19
Id. at 305, 178 N.E.2d at 718, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 318.
2
01Id. at 307-08, 178 N.E2d at 719-20, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 319-20 (dissenting
opinion).
21 Compare Leerburger v. Hennessey Realty Co., 154 App. Div. 158, 138
N.Y. Supp. 921 (1st Dep't 1912), aff'd men., 214 N.Y. 659, 108 N.E. 1099
(1915). In that case the defendant, whom the plaintiff sought to compel
to abate a nuisance, argued that he could not do so because he had sold
the land and therefore would be guilty of trespass if he entered and attempted to abate the nuisance. The court answered that the purchaser
was under a duty to cooperate with the defendant's efforts to abate the
nuisance because "the notice of lispendens was filed, and .. . the property
was taken subject to and with notice of the pending action." Id. at 161, 138
N.Y. Supp. at 923-24.

